Kant's Theory of KnowledgeClarendon Press, 1909 - 324 pages |
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Expressions et termes fréquents
according to Kant activity actual appearances apperception appre apprehension argument assertion aware belong bodies in space categories Kant categories of relation causality ception coexistence colour combine the manifold conception conclusion conform connexion consciousness consequently consider Cook Wilson corresponding Descartes determine difficulty distinction distinguish elements empirical perception existence experience extensive quantities fact faculty form of perception Formal Logic forms of judgement geometrical judgements given Hence hension identity imagination implies impossible inner sense involved kind ledge mathematics means merely metaphysics mind nature necessary necessity object of perception ourselves particular passage perceived pheno phenomena phenomenon physical world possible presupposes presupposition priori judgements problem Prol pure perception quantity question reality representations reproduction respect schema self-consciousness sensation sensibility sequence substratum succession synthetic temporally related tence thought tion transcendental Transcendental Deduction triangle understanding unified unity universal valid vindication visual perception words
Fréquemment cités
Page 3 - If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can discover the powers thereof; how far they reach; to what things they are in any degree proportionate; and where they fail us, I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities.
Page 104 - First, our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them; and thus we come by those ideas we have, of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities...
Page 105 - ... the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without ; and such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds ; which we being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas, as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself ; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with...
Page 104 - Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas ; how comes it to be furnished ? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety ? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge ? To this I answer in one word, from experience ; in that all our knowledge is founded ; and from that it ultimately derives itself.
Page 105 - But as I call the other sensation, so I call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself.
Page 104 - ... several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them: and thus we come by those ideas we have, of Yellow, White, Heat, Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, Sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions.
Page 104 - Our observation employed either, about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.
Page 105 - Secondly, the other fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas is, — the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; — which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from tilings without.
Page 194 - I think' to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me.