perfect character, he paid a price of redemp tion, in virtue of which he is invested with all power and authority in heaven and earth.

§ 7. We also believe that a Covenant was implied between God and the first Man. The Condition of it was perseverance in that state of rectitude in which he was created. The first transgression was a breach of Covenant; and consequently the favours which depended on the condition were forfeited. The nature of the case excluded the possibility of this or a similar Covenant with man to be repeated, except with one who was originally free from sin. Hence the necessity, the conditional necessity, of the immaculate conception of the second Adam, the Lord from heaven, and of his continuing "holy, harmless, and undefiled, separate from sinners:" and hence he received the Spirit without measure, not only for himself but for others. Out of his fullness, who is made head over all things to his church, all his spiritual members receive," and "and grace for grace."

8. That God entered into Covenant with Abraham and his posterity the Jews, needs no formal evidence. The condition of it was

willing obedience; and while the benefits of

compliance were many, the threatenings for non

compliance were awful and tremendous. Merciful promises were interwoven with the whole Mosaic code, and in no instance were they exempt from performing the equitable conditions, including faith and repentance, love and obedience. The Christian church also is dealt with in the way of a Covenant, with conditions and sanctions. The basis of it, as addressed to mankind, is divine mercy testified, in virtue of our blessed Saviour's adequate price of redemption. The conditions are,-if we would obtain pardon, it must be on our unfeigned repentance; if we would be justified, it must be on our believing with the heart God's testimony concerning Jesus; if we would be saved, it must be in the way of unreserved obedience to God's revealed will; if we would be happy, it must be in the way of holiness. This is our notion of a covenant and its conditions. Now what is there in this Calvinistic system inconsistent with the idea of a covenant?' The mischief, it seems, lurks out of sight. But what is it? When all were disabled by sin to perform the conditions equitably required, we further hold, that some are enabled to perform the required conditions by special favour and purpose. God foresaw that all with one consent would fail in performing them, if left to themselves, with nothing more than promises and sanctions, or a declaration of an all-sufficient Saviour,

blessings on compliance, and misery on refusal; and therefore determined that the covenant should not be without effect.

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My counsel shall stand, and I will do my pleasure." "He

shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in

his hands."

§ 9. That God was pleased, under different dispensations, to promise reward to the obe'dient, and to threaten punishment to the dis

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obedient,' is so very plainly taught in scripture, that no person of common understanding is ever likely to controvert it; beside that the equity of the case carries its own evidence of propriety. Destitute as Calvinists may be of penetration in other things, and especially the moderns, the enthusiasts of the present day, they are very willing to admit the idea of a Covenant, and of course the conditions' which belong to it. They also can distinguish between a promise and a purpose; and that the former is never connected, properly speaking, with cer'tain and infallible salvation' to any who shall 'not comply with the expressed conditions.' Much less do they suppose that absolute and 'inevitable perdition is threatened to any num'ber, or to any description, of persons, except as

*Refut. p. 171.

they shall not comply with the expressed con'ditions.' And yet his Lordship roundly asserts, that the very idea of a Covenant is inconsist'ent with the Calvinistic system! But how? Because, he thinks, absolute decrees reject all 'conditions. Absolute decrees say, that it ' is irreversibly determined by the arbitrary will of God, that you shall or shall not be saved, 'without any respect to your conduct.'

§ 10. I am very willing that his Lordship's objections should have all the force that can be imagined in this argument, without any palliation or concealment, in hope that the answer to it will be received with equal candour. Dó absolute decrees reject' all conditions? It is a plain fact, recorded by divine inspiration, that God had purposed or 'decreed' that the crew who sailed with St. Paul in his voyage to Rome, should, with himself, remain in safety. “And now I exhort you to be of good cheer; for there shall be no loss of any man's life among you, but of the ship. For there stood by me this night the angel of God, whose I am, and whom I serve, saying, Fear not Paul; thou must be brought before Cæsar; and lo, God hath given thee all them that sail with thee. Wherefore, sirs, be of good cheer: for I believe God, that it shall be even as he told me."-Here is not only a decree, but one revealed; but does it

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reject all conditions;' No, for St. Paul very rationally and consistently "said to the centurion, and to the soldiers, Except these abide in the ship, ye cannot be saved."* If his Lordship supposes that Calvinists cannot distinguish between a conditional and an absolute decrec, he may be under a mistake. We believe that the decree, for instance, of creating the first chaos was absolute, for non-existence could furnish no condition. But the decree to adorn existing matter was conditional, because without the condition of substance, there could be no form. Every series or chain of events decreed, implies that one link is to be connected with the other;-nor can we admit that free-will is qualified to charm away or to dissolve this connexion, for these reasons, among many others: first, because the infinite wisdom and power of the Decreer is sufficient to maintain it: secondly, because nothing is decreed by God but good, which is therefore worthy of all his perfections: thirdly, because no link in a chain of events can start into existence and occupy its place without an adequate cause: fourthly, because the will itself (though absolutely free from constraint to evil, as well as restraint from good,) is a link of the decreed chain: to which we may add fifthly, that there is no good volition but what is the

Acts xxvii. 22-25, 31.