of speech] into a belief that those words stand for ideas which, in truth, stand for none at all: which grand mistake it is almost incredible what a mist and darkness it has cast over the understandings of men, otherwise the most rational and clear-sighted.

I shall therefore endeavour, so far as I am able, [ 28 to put myself in the posture of the solitary philosopher. I will confine my thoughts and enquiries to the naked scene of my own particular ideas,] from which I may expect to derive the following advantages.

First. I shall be sure to get clear of all [29 verbal] controversies purely verbal. The [30 springing up of] which weeds in almost all the sciences has been [ 29 the ] a most fatal obstruction to the growth of true and sound knowledge: and accordingly is at this day esteem'd as such, and made the great and just complain: of the wisest men.

Secondly. 'Tis reasonable to expect that [31 by this] the troubk of sounding, or examining, or comprehending any notion ma be very much abridg'd. For it oft happens that a notion, wher it is cloathed with words, seems tedious and operose, and hard to be conceiv'd, which yet being stript of that garniture, the ideas shrink into a narrow compass, and are view'd almost by on: glance of thought.

Thirdly. I shall have fewer objects to consider than other me seem to have had. [32 Because] I find myself to want several of those supposed ideas, in contemplating of which the philosophers do usually spend much pains and study. [29 nay, even of those (which without doubt will appear very surprising) that pass for simple, particular ideas. It is inconceivable what cannot be believ'd what a wonderfull emptyness and scarcity of ideas that man shall descry who will lay aside all use of words in his meditations.

Fourthly. Having remov'd the veil of words, I may expect to have a clearer prospect of the ideas that remain in my understanding. To behold the deformity of errour we need only undress it.]

28 Erased. On the opposite page-to take off the mask of words, and obtain a naked view of my own particular ideas.'

2 Erased.

30 Instead of insisting on.'
31 Instead of hereby.'
92 Instead of For that.'

H

Fifthly. This seemeth to be a sure [33 way] to extricate myself out of that fine and subtile net of abstract ideas; which has so miserably perplex'd and entangled the minds of men, and that with this peculiar circumstance, that by how much the finer and the more curious was the wit of any man, by so much the deeper was he like to be ensnar'd and faster held therein.

Sixthly. So long as I confine my [34 thoughts] to my own ideas divested of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The objects I consider I [35 clearly] and adequately know. I cannot be deceiv'd in thinking I have an idea which I have not. Nor, on the other hand, can I be ignorant of any idea that I have. It is not possible for me to think any of my own ideas are alike or unlike which are not truly so. To discern the agreements and disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what simple ideas are included in any [36 compound ] idea, and what not, [37 there is nothing requisite but] an attentive perception of what passes in my own understanding.

But the attainment of all these advantages does presuppose an entire deliverance from the deception of words, which I dare scarce promise myself. So difficult a thing it is to dissolve a union so early begun, and confirm'd by so long a habit, as that betwixt words and ideas.

Which difficulty seems to have been very much encreas'd by the [38 doctrine of abstraction]. For so long as men thought abstract ideas were annex'd to their words, it does not seem strange they should use words for ideas. It being found an impracticable thing to lay aside the word and retain the abstract idea in the mind, which in itself was perfectly inconceivable. This made it necessary for them to reason and meditate about words, to which they suppos'd abstract ideas were connected, and by means whereof they thought those ideas could be conceiv'd, tho' they could not without them. [39 But surely those

33 Instead of 'means whereby.' 3 Instead of contemplations.' 35 Instead of perfectly.'

:6 Instead of complex."

37 Erased here- all this I can do without being taught by [another], there being requisite thereto nothing more than.' Also

ideas ought to be suspected that cannot endure the light without a covering.]

Another thing which makes words and ideas thought much [ 40 harder to separate ] than in truth they are, is the opinion that every name stands for an idea. [41 For] it is no wonder that men should fatigue themselves in vain, and find it a very difficult undertaking, when they endeavour'd to [42 obtain a clear and naked] view of [43 those] the ideas marked by those words, which in truth mark none at all; [43 as I have already shown many names often do not, even when they are not altogether [insignificant ], and I shall more fully show it hereafter].

[44 This] seems to me the principal cause why those men that have so emphatically recommended to others the laying aside the use of words in their meditations, and contemplating their bare ideas, have yet been so little able to perform it themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of the absurd opinions, and insignificant disputes, that grow out of the abuse of words. In order to redress these evils, they advise well that we attend to the ideas that are signified, and draw off our attention from the words that signify them. But how good soever this advice may be that they have given others 45 men, it is plain they little regarded it themselves, so long as they thought the only immediate use of words was to signifie ideas, and that the immediate signification of every general name was a determinate abstract idea.

Which having been shown to be mistakes, a man may now, with much greater ease, deliver himself from the imposture of words. He that knows he hath no other than particular ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the abstract idea annexed to any name. And he that knows names [43 when made use of in the propriety of language] do not always stand for ideas, will spare himself the labour of looking for ideas where there are none to be had. Those obstacles being now remov❜d, I earnestly desire that every one would use his utmost endeavour to attain a clear and naked view of [46 the] ideas he would consider [47 by separating] from them all that varnish and mist of words,

which so fatally blinds the judgment and dissipates the attention of men.

This is, I am confident, the shortest way to knowledge, and cannot cost too much pains in coming at. In vain do we extend our view into the heavens, and rake into the entrails of the earth. In vain do we consult the writings and discourses of learned men, and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity. We need only draw the curtain of words, to behold the fairest tree of knowledge, whose fruit is excellent and within the reach of [48 our hand].

Unless we take care to clear the first principles of knowledge from the [49 incumbrance and delusion] of words, [50 the consequences we draw from them] we may make infinite reasonings upon them to no purpose. We may [ 51 deduce consequences from] consequences, and be never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall only lose ourselves the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes.

I do therefore intreat whoever designs to read the following sheets, that he would make my words the occasion of his own thinking, and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in reading that I had in writing them. By this means it will be easy for him [52 to discover the truth or falsity of what I say]. He will be out of all danger of being deceiv'd by my words. And I do not see what inducement he can have to err in considering his own naked, undisguised ideas.

That I may contribute, so far as in me lies, to expose my thoughts [50 to the] fairly to the understanding of the reader, I shall throughout endeavour to express myself in the clearest, plainest, and most familiar 53 manner, abstaining from [50 all flourish and pomp of words], all hard and unusual terms which are [50 commonly] pretended by those that use them to cover a sense [50 intricate and] abstracted and sublime.

[50 I pretend not to treat of anything but what is obvious and [50 accommodated to] the understanding of every reasonable man.]

B.

ARTHUR COLLIER.

THE simultaneous publication of a conception of the nature of sensible reality so far accordant as that of Berkeley and Collier has been considered by historians of philosophy so curious that I am induced here to reprint the Introduction to Collier's Clavis Universalis: or, a new Inquiry after Truth, being a Demonstration of the Non-existence, or Impossibility, of an External World'. The reader of Berkeley may thus conveniently compare, with what Berkeley taught, Collier's thesis regarding the inexistence of the material world.

Arthur Collier was born on the 12th of October, 1680-more than four years before Berkeley-at the rectory of Langford Magna in Wiltshire. He entered Pembroke College, Oxford, in July 1697. He succeeded his father as rector of Langford Magna in 1704, and continued to hold that living till his death in 1732. One of his near neighbours, during the first years of his incumbency, was John Norris, the English Malebranche, rector of Bemerton, author of An Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World (1701-4), who died in 1711.

From his own account, Collier seems to have adopted his new though: regarding the meaning of sensible existence or reality about 1703, though he did not publish it till 1713, in the early part of which year the Clavis Universalis appeared.

Five interesting letters of Collier, in exposition and defence of his notion of Matter, are given in Benson's Memoirs. Two of them were written in 1714, and the others in 1715, 1720, and 1722. That written in 1715 is addressed to Dr. Samuel Clarke. Two of the others are to Samuel Low, a grammarian; another was sent to Dr. Waterland; and the last is addressed to Mr. Shepherd, Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford.

1 The motto of this work, taken from Malebranche, is Vulgi assensus et approbatio, circa materiam difficilem, est certum argu

mentum falsitatis istius opinionis cui (TSsentitur. De Inquir. Verit. Lib. III. p. 194.