An enquiry concerning human understanding. A dissertation on the passions. An enquiry concerning the principles of morals. The natural history of religion

Couverture
T. Cadell, in the Strand: and A. Kincaid, and A. Donaldson, at Edinburgh., 1772
 

Table des matières

I
3
II
17
III
23
IV
35
V
53
VI
69
VII
73
VIII
93
XV
206
XVI
210
XVII
214
XVIII
215
XIX
223
XX
231
XXII
247
XXIII
269

IX
119
X
125
XI
149
XII
167
XIII
185
XIV
191
XXV
277
XXVI
297
XXVII
315
XXVIII
327
XXIX
335
XXX
407

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Expressions et termes fréquents

Fréquemment cités

Page 76 - When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion ; any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other.
Page 57 - Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared in the past.
Page 57 - Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses. We should never know how to adjust means to ends, or to employ our natural powers in the production of any effect. There would be an end at once of all action, as well as of the chief part of speculation.
Page 148 - So that, upon the whole, we may conclude that the Christian religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity. And whoever is moved by faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most...
Page 67 - Here, then, is a kind of preestablished harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas ; and though the powers and forces by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us, yet our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the same train with the other works of nature.
Page 175 - But another man, who never took the pains to observe the demonstration, hearing a mathematician, a man of credit, affirm the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones, assents to it, ie receives it for true.
Page 171 - By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them (if that be possible), and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself, or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from some other cause still more unknown to us...
Page 40 - ... ball return in a straight line, or leap off from the second in any line or direction ? All these suppositions are consistent and conceivable. Why then should we give the preference to one, which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest ? All our reasonings a priori will never be able to show us any foundation for this preference.
Page 47 - ... all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition, that the future will be conformable to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question.
Page 75 - Complex ideas may, perhaps, be well known by definition, which is nothing but an enumeration of those parts or simple ideas, that compose them.

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