the assertions of others, they do not incline to conceal their authority, but are desirous that it should be known; and would not, on any consideration, convey a wrong impression. This is their general character, although there is a difference among individuals of this class, and some are found to be less particular in their ordinary asseverations and in testimony, than others.

(2) There is a second class of persons, who would esteem themselves injured in having their veracity suspected, but who have formed habits, which render it necessary, that their testimony should be carefully examined. We allude particularly to the habit, which some have formed of telling extraordinary stories, or anecdotes of whatever kind, which are intended, and are calculated to interest. They consider themselves in a measure pledged to meet the interest, which they know to be excited on the part of those present, and are, therefore, under an extraordinary temptation to enliven and embellish their narration. If any circumstances have escaped their memory, which were essential to the unity of the story, their own invention is taxed to furnish them, since it is too late to search for, and of too much consequence to omit them. They become in time not a little insensible to the false colouring, which they give to their statements, and convey erroneous impressions, without being conscious of an intention to deceive.

Such persons, when called upon to testify on oath, wifl be likely to give a false colouring to the most serious statements, similar to that, which heightens their discourses to their fire-side hearers. We would not say, that they intentionally do this. But those, who are acquainted with the power of habit, will readily imagine the possibility of their thus doing, without its being implied, that they are designedly untrue.

§. 421. Of the influence of friendship, &c. on testimony.

Friendship is generally founded on our favourable opin ion of the good qualities of those, towards whom we have

friendly feelings. In the ordinary course of things, no one can be expected to cherish the feelings of friendship towards a person, whom he knows to be a knave, or a hypocrite, or in any other respects essentially bad. Whenever a witness, therefore, is called upon to give testimony unfavourable to the case of a friend, he will find, on a little examination of himself, that his testimony is modified by his own previous feelings and opinions. This modification of our testimony, or rather of the belief and experience, on which our testimony is founded, is often effected with great rapidity, and in almost all cases by a process, to which we yield very slight attention

Although our own eyes have been the witnesses, we can hardly suspect one, to whom we had ascribed so many good qualities, of committing a crime. We suppose, that we ourselves may be mistaken, and are led, both in conse quence of our own supposed liability to mistake, and in consequence of our previous convictions of the criminate person's goodness, to give his conduct the most favourable construction.---The publick testimony, therefore, although given under the most solenin circumstances, will correspond to this very favourable mental construction, which has been previously formed, and of which we ourselves are in a measure insensible.

Such testimony may be critically examined, and without any necessary i 1.peachment of the witness' integrity. If friendship have secretly taken away any thing from the truth, it is the part of the judges, who are the investig tors of truth, to see, that it is demanded back again. The same views will hold, where dislike exists. It has an equal degree of influence in perplexing and prejudicing testimony, with personal friendships.

§. 422. Influence of personal interest on testimony.

The love of gain is a passion, which is greatly nourished by many circumstances in our situation. As riches not only deliver their possessors from many inconveniences, incident to a want of them; but secure influence and

An

respect, we find one reason in these effects of it, why this passion has taken so deep root in the minds of men. attachment to pleasure, and other modifications of selflove, are hardly less strong, than the passion for wealth.-It is the tendency and result of these interested feelings to present whatever concerns ourselves in the happiest light, and to heap up arguments in our own favour; and on the other hand, to prevent our bestowing due attention or ordinary justice upon the concernments of others.

In all cases, therefore, where the private interest of the person, who gives testimony, is concerned, there are two claims; that of interest on the one side, and that of truth on the other.

The claims of one's own interest, which are so near his feelings, are carefully examined, and every circumstance, which could have an influence to make him act in accordance with that interest, has its full weight. While, on the other hand, we feel an indescribable reluctance to examine claims, which we anticipate will be against ourselves; and ignorance becomes to us, under these circumstances, a source of satisfaction.

Persons, who are placed in this situation, ought carefully to guard against the powerful and sometimes imperceptible influence, which is exerted over them ;-an influence, which is often pernicious to their understandings, and still more so to virtue.-Those, who hear and receive the testimony of persons interested, cannot do justice to the person or subject, which this testimony concerns, without making suitable allowance for the misrepresentations, which are found to arise from this source.

§. 423. Does the testimony come from a partisan?

There are parties in religion, parties in politicks, parties in neighbourhoods and families, and indeed we find them in almost every situation in life. The feelings of partisanship, which are renewed at every meeting of our opposers, and at the knowledge of every circumstance, calcula. ted to remind us of the existence of a controversy, are exceedingly strong. Hence the prejudices of parties, which

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are opinions, modified by these feelings, are tenacious, and conversions for one party to another are few.

It is a remark somewhere made by Hume, that suspicions of a person's being your enemy is one step towards making him such. Generally speaking, partisans have strong suspicions of those of the opposite denomination, and hence it is natural to expect, that there will be much of an inimical spirit. And every one knows, how difficult is a fair and candid statement of the concerns of those, whom we suspect to be hostile, or approaching to enmity. Under the influence of this bias, those who give testimony may be expected to seize upon circumstances, unfavourable to their adversaries, and to throw other circumstances of a different character into the back ground; and yet profess themselves unconscious of a premeditated design to do injustice.

§. 424. Of the memory in connexion with testimony.

The great majority of persons have sometimes occasion to complain of treachery of the memory. Facts, which happened some considerable time previous to the testimony given, may not be perfectly recollected.

We may expect, however, that the knowledge of the circumstances of a past event will possess increased ac curacy, when it appears, that the person has used such means as assist the memory, such as writing them down, and frequently repeating them.-We may be directed also in our inquiries on this point by the nature of the subIf the testimony ject, to which the testimony relates. concern words or a discourse spoken, which are peculiar ly evanesent, it is far from impossible, that the witness may not perfectly recollect.

There are many circumstances necessarily occurring at the time of hearing the witness' assertions, which will help in forming an opinion of his powers of recollection, but which cannot well be specified here.

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§ 425. On the testimony of the dying.

It may not be considered irrelevant to the general subject to offer some remarks on the testimony of those, who are thought to be near the period of their departure from the world. Such are generally supposed to utter themselves with a peculiar regard to the truth. It is supposed, that the nearness of the future world, while the present is passing away from them, operates upon them with the power of the most efficient motives, and that, under such circumstances, they will not be guilty of falsehood.

Great weight is undoubtedly to be given to the asseverations of a dying man, who is in the perfect exercise of his reasoning powers; but then our readiness to give credit to them must be regulated by circumstances.--If we make the supposition of the case of a person, condemned to death by the civil laws, the remarks, applicable to such a case, will suggest considerations, applicable to ordinary cases of death.

Let it be supposed, therefore, that a person is condemned to death, that he is about to be executed for some crime, but that he asserts his innocence to the last.

(1) The first circumstance to be considered here is, whether eternal things have any real influence upon his mind, and whether he looks upon death, as about to introduce him into the presence of God. If this be not the case, if God and the day of judgment have no terrors, his assertions are no more to be believed, than the assertions he made before condemnation. It is generally supposed, that the dying utter truth, in consequence of the operation upon them of motives drawn from eternity. But this supposition, under the circumstances now specified, cannot be admitted.

(2) It is to be considered again, whether the criminal have not some lingering hope of pardon. He knows it to be possible for this pardon to come, although it should be only an hour before the time of execution. To make confession, therefore, may be the means of destroying that life, to which he fondly clings; and hence, if he be guilty, he