sible from custom and fashion, when we would pass a judgment concerning the real value and intrinsick nature of things."

§. 416. Prejudices of mental indolence.

The catalogue of prejudices may be yet further increased; it would be no easy matter to give a perfect enumeration of them.- -Men often take up with erroneous sentiments, and expose themselves and others to all the ill effects of such wrong opinions, rather than submit to the mere labour of a thorough examination of them. These are prejudices of MENTAL INDOLence.

The mind, in the early part of life, exhibits much activity; every thing, that is novel, arrests its attention; and at that period all objects possess something of that charac

After the fervour of youth has passed, this activity generally ceases; the soul, no longer stimulated by, the excitement of novelty, seeks repose. To doubt leads to inquiry; inquiry is laborious, and, therefore, painful; and the resolution is, consequently, taken to harbour no doubts, to ask no questions.

This resolution, so fatal to the progress of the truth and to all right views, is sometimes taken for another reason. Inquiry, and the suggestion of doubts on all long established opinions are extremely distressing to those, who have not been in the habit of careful and exact investigation; and who have, therefore, no well settled and satisfactory views as to the powers of the mind, and the nature and degrees of evidence. To tear them from their ancient opinions is like the separation of old friends. It is in itself exceedingly trying; but there is a distress more poignant than that of the present moment, in the vaccillation, the tossing to and fro of the mind, which for a long time succeeds.--Men have been frequently induced by the experience of this unpleasant state of mind, which results from their previous neglect to examine and to form opinions with care, to give up inquiry altogether. They be come unwilling to have their mental slumbers disturbed;

preferring a quiet adherence to their long adopted belief, however erroneous it may be, to the endurance of the perplexing uneasiness of that state of skepticism, which intervenes between the rejection of old opinions and the formation of new.

f. 417. Of the methods of subduing prejudices.

It is no easy task fully to remove prejudices, especially where they have been of long standing. But in some cases we cannot decline attempting it, without evidently neglecting a duty, owed to a fellow-being. In the discharge of this difficult, but important duty, the following directions will not be without use.

(1) In attempting to subdue the prejudices of others, a scrupulous regard is to be had to their feelings.--It is implied in the very attempt to subdue a prejudice, that the views in respect to that particular subject, which we ourselves entertain, have the greater degree of correctness; but even this implied superiority is not unnecessarily to be obtruded on the prejudiced man's attention, but rather to be kept out of sight. The poorest man has his treasures of self-love, the most ignorant and prejudiced man has his pride of intellect; and if that self-love or that pride of intellect be offended, in vain will be all attempts at a reduction of their erroneous notions. So that a regard to the feelings and even the weaknesses of those, whose opinions we controvert, is due not more to the general claims of humanity, than to the success of the particular object, which we have in hand.

(2) Having by all suitable means conciliated the prejudiced man's feelings, the wrong sentiments, which he cherishes, may be attacked by direct argument. They may be shown to be ill founded by reasoning, conclusively deduced from propositions so plain and just, as to be admitted by both parties. This perhaps will answer the purpose, where the prejudices have not been of very long continuance, and have not acquired a great degree of strength.

(3) Where they are found to be very tenacious, another course is thought to be preferable. Let no direct attack be made upon the prejudice, which is to be opposed, but let it pass with as little immediate notice, as possible. Efforts should be made, in the mean while, to instruct the individval in those acknowledged truths, which have a distant, but direct connection with his false opinions. In this way his mind will be furnished with a mixture of truth and errour, instead of errour alone; hereafter the discordant elements will be carrying on a conflict of themselves; and his prejudices will certainly be weakened by this inward contest, and probably overthrown.

NOTE. Many writers have examined the subject of prejudices. A number of valuable remarks on this topick are found in Malebranche's Search after Truth. Lord Bacon, to whom the sciences are so much indebted, deemed the subject of prejudices deserving a place in the Novum Orgnum, where he has examined them under the designation of IDOLA. Dr. Watts in his book of Logick has devoted to it a valuable chapter, and also made soine remarks on it in his Improvement of the Mind. It has recently received new illustrations and embellishments from an article in the New Edinburgh Eneyelopaedia by M. Si

monde de Sismondi.

476

CHAPTER THIRTY SECOND.

EVIDENCE OF TESTIMONY.

§. 418. Of prejudices in connection with testimony.

From the view, which has been given of prejudiced judgments, one of the obvious inferences is, that great perversions and mistakes may be expected to exist in testimony.——We have already had occasion to say something of the nature of testimony, and of the grounds of belief in it. (§. 237.) If the subject had not been of importance, it would not have been resumed here; although some of the views just given admit of a ready and weighty application

to it.

As to the importance of this form of moral evidence, there can be no mistake. It not only influences our conduct in all our ordinary concerns; but is constantly appealed to, in courts of justice, and in the most serious and weighty transactions. Individuals are frequently required to give testimony, which involves, in its results, the reputation, property, and life of their fellows. But we have seen, in the preceding chapter, in how many ways their judgments are liable to be warped; and that this perversion may often exist without necessarily implying any evil intention. It is the object of this chapter to suggest a few rules of caution in respect to testimony, drawn chiefly from those susceptibilities in our mental constitution, which are the foundation of prejudices.

§. 419. Of the competency of the witness.

Before speaking of these circumstances, which perplex and give a wrong bias to the judgment, a prior inquiry seems to be as to the competency of the witness to form an opinion on that subject, to which his testimony relates.

Witnesses sometimes labour under a natural incapacity of judging, which necessarily annuls their testimony. A person, who is deprived of the sense of heating, is not capable of test fying to the oral assertions of others; and a blind man cannot give testimony on subjects, the knowl edge of which necessarily implies the existence of the sense of seeing. The competency of the witness, therefore, to judge in respect to that subject, on which his tes timony is given, is very justly to be examined into.And in the question of competency, we may not only inquire into the capacity, or want of it in the witness; we may further inquire into his opportunities of exercising that capacity, which he is acknowledged to possess. If he testifies, that he saw an object or action, when circumstances positively show, that he had no opportunity of thus seeing, his testimony is as much invalidated, as if he laboured under a natural incapacity of sight. If, for instance, it be necessarily implied in what he says, that he was in a particular place, but on inquiry circumstances satisfactorily show, that he was not there, then evidently he had no opportunity of knowing what he testifies, and his declarations are to be set aside.

§. 420. Of habits of veracity in connection with tcstimony.

People can hardly expect to hear the truth from those, who are in the practice of uttering falsehoods; and it is, therefore, proper to inquire, What are the witness' character and habits in this respect?--Of professed liars, we have here nothing to say. Of persons, who are in the practice of telling the truth, and whose habits are acknowledged to be those of veracity, a distinction may be made between two classes.

(1) Some men are, in principle and in practice, scru. pulous. They have so long and so steadily exhibited this trait, that it seems to be inherent, something in the constitution. Persons of this character are found to be somewhat averse to stating what has not come within their own personal observation and knowledge. When repeating