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one instance, that is, in no respect, different from them. Reason is incapable of any such variation. The conclufions, which it draws from confidering one circle, are the fame which it would form upon surveying all the circles in the universe. But no man, having seen only one body move after being impelled by another, could infer, that every other body will move after a like impulse. All inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of custom, not of reasoning *.

A

CUSTOM,

* Nothing is more usual than for writers even on moral, political, or physical fubjects, to diftinguish between reason and experience, and to suppose, that these species of argumentation are entirely different from each other. The former are taken for the mere refult of our intellectual faculties, which, by confidering à priori the nature of things, and examining the effects, that must follow from their operation, establish particular principles of science and philosophy. The latter are supposed to be derived entirely from fense and observation, by which we learn what has actually resulted from the operation of particular objects, and are thence able to infer, what will, for the future, result from them. Thus, for instance, the limitations and restraints of civil government, and a legal constitution may be defended, either from reafon, which, reflecting on the great frailty and corruption of human nature, teaches, that no man can safely be trusted with unlimited authority; or from experience and history, which inform us of the enormous abuses, that ambition, in every age and country, has been found to make of so imprudent a confi

dence.

The

CUSTOM, then, is the great guide of human life. 'Tis that principle alone, which renders our experience

:

The fame distinction betwixt reason and experience is maintained in all our deliberations concerning the conduct of life; while the experienced statesman, general, physician or merchant is trusted and followed; and the unpractised novice, with whatever natural talents endowed, neglected and despised. Tho' it be allowed, that reason may form very plaufible conjectures with regard to the consequences of such a particular conduct in such particular circumstances; 'tis still supposed imperfect, without the assistance of experience, which is alone able to give stability and certainty to the maxims, derived from study and reflection.

But notwithstanding that this diftinction be thus universally received, both in the active and speculative scenes of life, I shall not scruple to pronounce, that it is, at bottom, erroneous, or at least, superficial.

If we examine those arguments, which, in any of the sciences above-mentioned, are supposed to be the mere effects of reasoning and reflection, they will all be found to terminate, at last, in some general principle or conclufion, for which we can affign no reason but observation and experience. The only difference be twixt them and those maxims, which are vulgarly esteemed the refult of pure experience, is, that the former cannot be established without fome process of thought, and fome reflection on what we have observed, in order to distinguish its circumstances, and trace its consequences: Whereas in the latter, the experi enced event is exactly and fully similar to that which we infer as VOL. III,

E

the

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rience useful to us, and makes us expect for the future, a fimilar train of events with those which have

the result of any particular fituation. The history of a TIBERIUS or a NERO makes us dread a like tyranny were our monarchs freed from the restraints of laws and senates: But the observation of any fraud or cruelty in private life is sufficient, with the aid of a little thought, to give us the same apprehenfion; while it serves as an instance of the general corruption of human nature, and shews us the danger which we must incur by repofing an entire confidence in mankind. In both cafes, 'tis experience which is ultimately the foundation of our inference and conclusion.

There is no man so young and unexperienced, as not to have formed from observation, many general and just maxims concerning human affairs and the conduct of life; but it must be confeffed, that, when a man comes to put these in practice, he will be extremely liable to error, till time and farther experience, both enlarge these maxims, and teach him their proper use and application. In every situation or incident, there are many particular and seemingly minute circumstances, which the man of greatest talents is, at first, apt to overlook, tho' on them the justness of his conclusions, and confequently the prudence of his conduct, entirely depend. Not to mention, that, to a young beginner, the general observations and maxims occur not always on the proper occasions, nor can be immediately applied with due calmness and distinction. The truth is, an unexperienced reafoner could be no reasoner at all, were he absolutely unexperienced; and when we assign that character to any one, we mean it only in a comparative sense, and suppose him possessed of ex perience, in a smaller and more imperfect degree,

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appeared in the past. Without the influence of cuftom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact, beyond what is immediately present to the memory and senses. We should never know how to adjust means to ends, or to employ our natural powers in the production of any effect. There would be an end at once of all action, as well as of the chief part of speculation.

But here it may be proper to remark, that tho' our conclusions from experience carry us beyond our memory and senses, and assure us of matters of fact, which happened in the most distant places and most remote ages; yet some fact must always be present to the senses or memory, from which we may first proceed in drawing these conclufions. A man, who should find in a defert country the remains of pompous buildings, would conclude, that the country had, in antient times, been cultivated by civilized inhabitants; but did nothing of this nature occur to him, he could never form fuch an inference. We learn the events of former ages from history; but then we muit peruse the volumes, in which this inftruction is contained, and thence carry up our inferences from one teftimony to another, till we arrive at the eye-witnefses and spectators of these distant events. In a word, if we proceed not upon some fact, present to the memory or fenfes, our reasonings would be merely hy. pothetical; and however the particular links might

be connected with each other, the whole chain of inferences would have nothing to support it, nor could we ever, by its means, arrive at the knowlege of any real existence. If I ask, why you believe any particular matter of fact, which you relate, you must tell me some reason; and this reason will be fome other fact, connected with it: But as you cannot proceed after this manner, in infinitum, you must at laft terminate in some fact, which is present to your memory or fenfes; or must allow, that your belief is entitely without foundation.

WHAT then is the conclusion of the whole matter? A fimple one; tho' it must be confeffed, pretty remote from the common theories of philosophy. All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object, present to the memory or fenfes, and a customary conjunction betwixt that and any other object. Or in other words; having found, in many instances, that any two kinds of objects, flame and heat, snow and cold, have always been conjoined together; if flame or snow be presented anew to our senses; the mind is carried by custom to expect heat or cold, and to believe, that such a quality does exift, and will discover itself upon a nearer approach. This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. 'Tis an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive