opposition and mutual destruction of arguments as in every other kind of evidence. We frequently hefitate concerning the reports of others. We balance the opposite circumstances, which cause any doubt or uncertainty; and when we discover a superiority on any side, we incline to it; but still with a diminution of assurance, in proportion to the force of its antagonist.

THIS contrariety of evidence, in the present cafe, may be derived from several different causes; from the oppofition of contrary teftimony; from the character or number of the witnesses; from the manne, of their delivering their testimony; or from the union of all these circumstances. We entertain a fufpicion concerning any matter of fact, when the witnesses contradict each other; when they are but few, or of a suspicious character; when they have an interest in what they affirm; when they deliver their testimony with doubt and hefitation, or on the contrary, with too violent asseverations. There are many other par ticulars of the fame kind, which may diminish or deftroy the force of any argument, derived from human teftimony.

SUPPOSE, for instance, that the fact, which the teftimony endeavours to establish, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; in that cafe, the evidence, resulting from the testimony, admits a diminution,

nution, greater or less, in proportion as the fact is more or less unusual. The reason, why we place any credit in witnesses and historians is not from any connexion, which we perceive à priori between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them. But when the fact attested is fuch a one as has feldom fallen under our obfervation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences; of which the one destroys the other as far as its force goes, and the fuperior can only operate on the mind by the force, which remains. The very fame principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree of affurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another degree of affsurance against the fact, which they endeavour to establish; from which contradiction there necessarily arise a counterpoize, and mutual destruction of belief and autho rity.

I should not believe fuch a story were it told me by CATO; was a proverbial saying in ROME, even during the life-time of that philofophical patriot*. The incredibility of a fact, it was allowed, might invalidate fo great an authority.

THE INDIAN prince, who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of froft, reasoned

* PLUTARCH, in vita CATONIS,

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justly; and it naturally required very strong testimony to engage his affent to facts, which arose from a ftate of nature, with which he was unacquainted, and bore so little analogy to those events, of which he had had conftant and uniform experience. Tho' they were not contrary to his experience, they were not conformable to it *.

* NO INDIAN, 'tis evident, could have experience that water did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a fituation quite unknown to him; and 'tis impoffible for him to tell à priori what will result from it. 'Tis making a new experiment, the consequence of which is always uncertain. One may sometimes conjecture from analogy what will follow; but still this is but conjecture. And it must be confest, that, in the prefent case of freezing, the event follows contrary to the rules of analogy, and is such as a rational INDIAN would not look for. The operations of cold upon water are not gradual, according to the degrees of cold; but whenever it comes to the freezing point, the water passes in a moment, from the utmost liquidity to perfect hardness. Such an event, therefore, may be denominated extraordinary, and requires a pretty strong testimony, to render it credible to people in a warm climate: But still it is not miraculous, nor contrary to uniform experience of the course of nature in cases where all the circumstances are the fame. The inhabitants of SUMATRA have always seen water liquid in their own climate, and the freezing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy: But they never saw water in Muscovy during the winter; and therefore they cannot reasonably be positive whatwould there be the consequence.

Bur

し

Bur in order to increase the probability against the testimony of witnesses, let us suppose that the fact, which they affirm, instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and suppose also, that the teftimony, confidered apart, and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that cafe there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist.

A MIRACLE is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has eftablished these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable, that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in the air; that fire confumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be, that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words, a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle if it ever happen in the common course of nature. 'Tis no miracle that a man in seeming good health should die on a sudden; because such a kind of death, tho more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But 'tis a miracle, that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been. observed,

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observed, in any age or country: There muft, therefore, be an uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as an uniform experience amounts to a proof there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an oppofite proof, which is fuperior *.

* Sometimes an event may not, in itself, seem to be contrary to the laws of nature, and yet, if it were real, it might, by reafon of fome circumstances, be denominated a miracle; because, in fact, it is contrary to these laws. Thus if a person, claiming a divine authority, should command a fick person to be well, a healthful man to fall down dead, the clouds to pour rain, the winds to blow, in short, should order many natural events, which immediately follow upon his command; these might justly be esteemed miracles, because they are really, in this case, contrary to the laws of nature. For if any fufpicion remain, that the event and command concurred by accident, there is no miracle and no tranfgreffion of the laws of nature. If this fuf. picion be removed, there is evidently a miracle, and a tranfgreffion of these laws; because nothing can be more contrary to nature than that the voice or command of a man should have such an influence. A miracle may be accurately defined, a trangreffion of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, er by the interpofition of some invisible agent. A miracle may either be discoverable by men or not. This alters not its nature

and