THE

METHODIST

MAGAZINE,

DESIGNED AS A

COMPEND OF USEFUL KNOWLEDGE,

AND OF

RELIGIOUS AND MISSIONARY

INTELLIGENCE,

FOR THE YEAR OF OUR LORD

1826.

VOLUME IX.

New-York,

PUBLISHED BY N. BANGS AND J. EMORY, FOR THE METHODIST
EPISCOPAL CHURCH, AT THE CONFERENCE OFFICE,

13 CROSBY-STREET.

Azor Hoyt, Printer.

1826.

NO. 1.]

FOR JANUARY, 1826.

[VOL. 9.

DIVINITY.

SPACE, BEING AN INFINITE PERFECTION, PROVES THE
EXISTENCE OF AN INFINITE SUBSTANCE.

(From Drew's Essay on the Being, Attributes, and Providence of the Deity.)
WHEN We contrast existence-even in its most simple state-
with absolute nonexistence, we cannot but acknowledge that the...
former is vastly superior to the latter; and, in proportion as it is
superior, it must be a positive good. Now, simple existence,
if it be a positive good, must be a natural excellence; and, in
proportion as it is a natural excellence, it must include a portion
of that noble perfection which absolute existence constitutes.

From this principle it will follow, that the more extensive
existence is, the greater degree of this natural excellence or
perfection is in actual being. If existence be partial, then that
degree of natural perfection which it includes must be partial;
and if existence be limited, that degree which it implies must
also be limited. But if, on the contrary, existence be unlimited,
then that natural perfection which existence implies and con-
stitutes must necessarily be unlimited, and above all degrees;
and by being without limits, and above all degrees, it must be
as universal as existence itself. Existence, and that degree of
perfection which it implies and constitutes, must therefore always
coexist, and be inseparably connected together.

By the term substance, I understand some being or thing that
is capable of subsisting alone, without determining whether it
be finite or infinite. Substances, no doubt, are of various
orders; and in them, according to their respective natures, all
qualities which exist must necessarily inhere; and to them all
perfections must belong.

Now, if simple existence constitute or imply some degree of
natural perfection, which I presume no one will deny,-it
must be a perfection of something that exists positively; for it
is not less absurd to suppose it to be a natural perfection of a
negation, than to be a perfection of itself: and, whether this
something be a substance, or only an attribute, or a mode of
some substance, the conclusion will hold good; for in some
substance all our ideas of existing excellencies, or natural per-
fections, must finally terminate. If existence include a natural
perfection of some mode, this mode will prove the existence of
the substance of which it is a mode; and, if it include a perfec-
tion of some attribute, this attribute will prove the existence of
the substance with equal certainty; because neither an attribute
VOL. IX. January, 1826.

nor a mode can possibly exist without a substance. It therefore appears that every existing excellence or natural perfection necessarily implies the existence of some substance, to which it must primarily belong, and to which it must ultimately be referred.

It cannot be denied that excellencies or natural perfections may be of various orders; proceeding onward, from those which are included in simple existence, to the most exalted glory of superior intelligence, wisdom, and power. But in what scale of gradation soever we view these progressive perfections, they all necessarily presuppose some substance, whose existence is a primary excellence or a radical perfection, of which they all partake, and without which they could not be what they are. Hence, then, it is evident, that, as simple existence is a primitive and an essential property of substance, or rather is that which lies at the bottom of every essential property, and of every other perfection of it,-existence, instead of being a substance itself, is that primitive excellence or perfection, by which substances and their other perfections can be known, and distinguished from absolute nonentity.

As simple existence implies such a primitive excellence, that no other perfection, however exalted it may be, can be conceived, without presupposing this; so it must be granted, that whatsoever either constitutes simple existence, contributes towards it, or is essentially necessary to it, must also, according to its nature, include some excellence or natural perfection: for nothing that is wholly destitute of all excellence or perfection can be necessary to existence, in what light soever it may be viewed; since, if we suppose that to be necessary, which, by including no excellence or perfection, is proved to be unnecessary, we must include contradictory ideas in the supposition which we make.

Now, it is certain that space is essentially necessary to the existence of all material things;-perhaps I might have said, to finite existence in all its forms;-because whatever has a finite being must necessarily exist in space. But if every thing which is necessary to existence must include some excellence or natural perfection, it is unquestionable that every thing, which is at once necessary to existence and simple in its nature, must be a natural perfection exclusively; because it is both simple and necessary. It follows, therefore, that space, which is essentially necessary to finite existence, must, because it is simple, uniform, and infinite in its nature, be an exclusive and an infinite perfection. It must, therefore, primarily belong to some substance that is too exalted for finite comprehension.

As simple existence must be considered as the ground of all those natural perfections which in finite beings result from its various modes, so space must be considered as the substratum